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Abstract
This paper o¤ers a formal analysis of the relationship between changes
in government primary balance and debt-to-GDP ratio. it establishes the
conditions under which a scal consolidation increases - instead of de-
creasing - the stock of government liabilities relative to aggregate output.
A crucial role is played by the relationship between the elasticities of aver-
age cost of debt and nominal output to primary balance: while the former
depends on debt maturity and risk premia dynamics, the latter relates to
the well-known controversy on the size of government spending multipli-
ers. The paper shows an application to the ongoing scal consolidation
process in the Eurozone.
JEL Classi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Keywords: debt-to-GDP ratio, debt sustainability, government bud-
get.
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1 Introduction
As most economies have been implementing severe scal consolidation processes,
the debate is open on the e¤ectiveness of what has been called "economic auster-
ity" (Gros 2011,Blanchard and Leigh 2013, Mauro et al 2013). If the reduction
of debt-to-GDP ratios is believed to be the most appropriate measure of the
e¤ectiveness of scal consolidations processes, it is necessary to acknowledge
the presence of several ways in which changes in the scal position can actually
achieve the objective, at least in the short-run.
This short note outlines a simple theoretical framework in which such a
transmission mechanism can be properly analyzed. Using the arithmetic of
government budget constraint, this note identies and discusses the conditions
under which a change in primary balance causes a change of the same sign in the
debt-to-GDP ratio. We employ this condition as a measure of the e¤ectiveness
of austerity.
Our starting point is that there are three forces acting on the transmission
chain from primary budget changes to debt-to-GDP dynamics. One is direct: ce-
teris paribus, an increase/decrease in the government net absoption of resources
causes an increase/decrease of the stock of nominal debt. The other two are
indirect, and work in opposite ways: an increase (decrease) in primary decit
increases (decreases) nominal growth in the short-run and therefore reduces (in-
creases) debt-to-GDP ratio. At the same time, by modifying risk premia on
the existing and new debt, increases (decreases) the average cost of debt and
therefore increases (decreases) debt-to-GDP . We consider the government pri-
mary balance as the primitive scal policy instrument, disregarding here the
disaggregation between revenue and expenditure components of the budget.
Our results show that a given primary budget reduction is successful in caus-
ing an actual decrease of debt-to-GDP ratio only if elasticities of debts average
cost and nominal output with respect to primary decit satisfy certain condi-
tions. The natural heterogeneity of those conditions across di¤erent economies
(according to the composition of the total budget) can have a coordinated scal
policy move result in opposite e¤ects, even with similar values for elasticities.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the setting
and identies the conditions, providing also a graphical representation and an
application to Euro-area economies. Section 3 discusses analytically the results
and section 4 o¤ers some concluding remarks.
2 Conditions for e¤ectiveness of austerity
This section identies and discusses the conditions connecting changes in the
policy instrument to their e¤ects on the debt-to-GDP ratio. We also present an
application to major EMU economies.
The starting point is the simple nominal government ow budget constraint:
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where Bt is the end-of-the-period stock of government nominal liabilities,
#t is the average cost of debt (obtained by dividing interest payments by total
stock of gross government liabilities) and Dprt is the primary budget decit
1 .
We assume that #t is a function of D
pr
t , as changes in primary budget a¤ect
risk premia on new debt and therefore its average cost, even though the last
step crucially depends on debts maturity structure.
In order to express (1) in terms of debt-to-GDP dynamics, we divide it by
nominal GDP (Yt):
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The above expression is the familiar law of motion of the stock of government
liabilities relative to aggregate output (Marattin and Marzo 2010). Assuming
the policy instrument to be the primary decit Dprt (> 0); we analyze how
Bt
Yt
is a¤ected by policy changes. Equation (2) explicitly takes into account that
changes in primary decit contemporaneously a¤ect the level of income. Partial
derivative of (2) with respect to Dprt reads:
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with "DYt being the elasticity of nominal output with respect to primary
balance: "DY

=
Dprt
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. Note that "DYt > 0 in the short run, because under
nominal rigidities output is demand-determined. We cannot make unambiguous
statements on "DY in the long run, for two fundamental reasons. First, we do
not have any a-priori on the cyclical position of the economy; a decit-nanced
push in aggregate demand might have long-term e¤ect if used to close output
gap. Second, as mentioned in the Introduction, we disregard the distinction
between expenditure and revenue components of the primary decit; while the
former - assuming non-productive public spending - has no real e¤ects in the
long run, the latter might do.
It is crucial to remind that "DYt does not coincide with the standard den-
ition of the scal policy multiplier, which normally measures the output level
e¤ect resulting from level changes in scal variables2

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
. Empirical estima-
tions of @Yt
@Dprt
oscillates around unity3 for government spending multipliers and
1For the moment we assume a primary decit, so that it enters equation (1) with a positive
sign. It would be more correct to reason in terms of primary budget position, implying the
use of absolute value (displaying a decit or a surplus according to, respectively, the positive
or negative values of Dpr). We specify that later on.
2Or, equivalently, the percentage change in GDP following a one per cent increase in the
output share of the scal variable.
3 In recent literature we can nd estimations around one (Barro and Redlick 2010, Guajardo
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vary considerably when it comes to tax multiplier4 . Moreover, recent research
(Auerbach and Gorodnichenko 2012, Corsetti et al 2010, Batini et al 2010) has
emphasized that scal policy multipliers vary according to the cyclical position
of the economy. The elasticity "DYt - being based on percentage change as some
of the empirical studies - is even more dependant on the state of the economy, as
it is the product of the multiplier and the primary balance-to-GDP ratio. As the
latter is often very modest, it is very unlikely that, regardless the multipliers
size, the elasticity is greater than one.
After a simple manipulation equation (2) becomes:
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where we denote by "D#

=
Dprt
#t
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the elasticity of the average cost of
debt to primary budget position. Regarding the sign of "D#, no unambigu-
ous theoretical a priori can be made. However many empirical contributions
(Bernoth et al 2004, Ardagna et al 2007, Laubach 2009) point out a positive
relationship between deterioration of budget position and the average cost of
debt, through the increase in risk premia occurring as a result of the increase
in credit risk.
Lets now study the sign, assuming that the budget displays a primary decit
(Dprt > 0) :
If (3) is positive, it means that a decit reduction succeeds in causing a
reduction in debt-to-GDP ratio. We call this scenario "pro-austerity", in order
to indicate that a given decrease in primary budget is e¤ective in reducing the
stock of government liabilities as a ratio to nominal income.
If, on the other hand, (3) is negative, then a decit reduction increases the
debt-to-GDP ratio and the budget consolidation results to be ine¤ective. We
label this scenario "anti-austerity".
pro  austerity :
@
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anti  austerity :
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Obviously when (3) is equal to zero, then changes in primary decit do
not a¤ect debt-to-GDP ratio. In that case the three e¤ects recalled in the
introduction o¤set each other.
et al 2010, Ramey 2011 and Hall 2009) and some above one (Blanchard and Perotti 2002,
Monacelli et al 2010, Blinder and Zandi 2010, Acconcia et al 2011, Fragetta and Melina
2011).
4Romer and Romer 2010, using the so-called "narrative approach", nd it to be larger than
three.
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Looking at expression (3) it is easy to spot the su¢ cient condition for the pre-
vailence of the pro or anti austerity regime. A budget consolidation is certainly
successful if j "DYt j< min
j "D#t j; 1	, whereas the "anti-austerity" regime dom-
inates if j "DYt j> max
j "D#t j; 1	 . Given that, as noted above, it is quite
unlikely that those elasticities are greater than one, those conditions basically
tell us that a primary budget consolidation is certainly e¤ective if the elasticity
of nominal output to primary decit is lower that the elasticity of the average
cost of debt. Otherwise, the output loss associated to a budget consolidation is
too large to allow for an actual reduction of the debt-to-GDP ratio.
In order to compute the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the prevai-
lence of the pro/anti austerity regime it is necessary to study the sign of (3):
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Multiplying both sides by Dprt it becomes:
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Note that the term D
pr
t
Bt 1#t
+ 1 is the inverse of the share of total primary
decit devoted to interest payments on past debt.
To account for the possibility that the primary budget position displays a
surplus Sprt (=  Dprt ) rather than a decit, the above conditions can be ex-
pressed in absolute values. We therefore state that a given change in primary
budget is successful in creating the expected change in debt-to-GDP ratio if:
j "D#t j>
Dt
Bt 1#t
j "DYt j  
Dprt
Bt 1#t
(7)
and it produces the opposite e¤ect if, instead:
j "D#t j<
Dt
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In other words, the e¤ectiveness of a scal policy aimed at reducing the stock
of government liabilities relative to nominal income depends on the position of
"D# with respect to a thresold " = D
pr
t +Bt 1#t
Bt 1#t
"DYt   D
pr
t
Bt 1#t
Such a threshold can be drawn in a space "D#t   "DYt (Figure 1):
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A given combination of the two elasticities allows an actual debt-to-GDP re-
duction after a primary budget consolidation only if it falls in the "pro-austerity"
space. The threshold line " represents the locus of elasticities "DYt and "
D#
t
that leave BY unchanged. The slope of "
 is given by D
pr
#Bt 1
+ 1, from which
we can see that the line is downward sloping if the government accumulates
a primary surplus larger than interest payments (that is, if there is a budget
surplus).
Furthermore, Figure 1 clearly shows that even if the values of "DYt and "
D#
t
are the same across two (or more) economies, the e¤ect of a one per cent change
in primary budget can produce opposite e¤ects in terms of the debt-to-GDP
ratio dynamics.
Figure 2 replicates Figure 1 with data (year 2011) on the four major EMU
economies and the overall Eurozone:
We can observe that in 2011 Spain had the smallest "pro-austerity" space,
whereas Germany had the widest. Hence a coordinated scal policy move (even
in presence of similar values of elasticities "DYt and "
D#
t ) can have opposite
e¤ects on their respective debt-to-GDP ratios if we are anywhere in the space
between the two lines.
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3 What can change the pro-austerity space?
Figure 2 clearly shows that the threshold line " can considerably di¤er across
similar countries, according to their budget position. This section analyzes the
framework outlined in section 2, focusing on how di¤erent structure of budget
decits at any point in time can increase or decrease the likelihood of a budget
consolidation plans success.
The partial derivative of the threshold " with respect to interest payments
reads:
@"
@#tBt 1
=
Dpr
#tBt 1
(1  "DYt ) (9)
which shows us that countries with higher interest payments on the existing
stock of debt see their pro-austerity space decrease for any "DYt < 1 and increase
for any "DYt > 1:
In other words, if a country has an higher interest rate payment, a given
reduction in primary budget decit has a lower (higher) chance to succeed if
nominal output elasticity to primary decit is smaller (greater) than one.
What is the intuition of that result?
In order to understand it, let us recall the fundamental equation (2), written
in a way that can best emphasize the three transmission channel from Dprt to
Bt
Yt
:
7
Bt
Yt
= #t(D
pr
t )Bt 1 
1
Yt (D
pr
t )
+
Dprt
Yt (D
pr
t )
(10)
and the derivative with respect to primary decit is given by:
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where we have a "direct" e¤ect
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indicating the movement of the
primary decit-to-GDP ratio, and an "indirect" e¤ect
h
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dicating the joint e¤ect of primary budget changes on current nominal income
and the average cost of debt.
If "DYt = 1 a 1% reduction in D
pr
t is completely o¤set by a corresponding
1% contraction in nominal output Y , so that the "direct" e¤ect is zero. The
only e¤ects at work are the two operating on the rst and second member on the
right-hand-side of (10), summarized by the "indirect" e¤ect in (11). Therefore
it is clear that an actual reduction of BtYt can occur only if #t(D
pr
t ) diminishes
more than proportionally (that is, if "D#t > 1). For "
D#
t = 1 a given reduction
in Dprt does not have any e¤ect on the debt-to-GDP ratio. In fact, the point 
"DYt ; "
D#
t ) = (1; 1

belongs to the locus of elasticities which leave BtYt unchanged
after movements inDprt : It is also clear than such a point is the one around which
the locus twists anytime we have a change in the scal variables.
It is therefore interesting to investigate what happens to the left and to the
right of
 
"DYt ; "
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t ) = (1; 1

:
If "DYt < 1 the direct channel is positive, as the primary decit-to-GDP ratio
diminishes after a reduction in Dprt , therefore
Bt
Yt
tends to rise. At the same time
the indirect e¤ect is negative (so a reduction in primary decit increases debt)
as for any "DYt < 1 it is also true that on the threshold line "
DY
t > "
D#
t since
its slope
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is by construction greater than one (which in turn is the
slope of the locus of points "DYt = "
D#
t ). The magnitude of this latter e¤ect
(pushing towards an increase - rather than decrease - of debt-to-GDP ratio) is
bigger the higher the share of decit devoted to interest payments (#tBt 1) :
Therefore an higher #tBt 1 shrinks the area where austerity is e¤ective.
The opposite happens when "DYt > 1. In this case the direct e¤ect is nega-
tive, as the nominal income falls more than primary decit. As a result primary-
decit-to-GDP ratio increases, and debt-to-GDP ratio tends to increase. The
indirect e¤ect, however, is positive, since on the threshold line "DYt < "
D#
t in the
region where "DYt > 1. Therefore the indirect e¤ect pushes towards a reduction
of BtYt and its size is bigger the higher #tBt 1: Hence, for any "
DY
t > 1 an higher
share of interest payments increases the likelihood of a successful austerity plan.
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As mentioned in Section 2 when we introduced "DYt , the empirical plausibil-
ity of "DYt > 1 is however very limited.
4 Conclusions
The main dimension on which the success of austerity measures can be evaluated
is their ability to reduce debt-to-GDP ratio. This paper o¤ers a very simple
theoretical framework to analyze how and when scal policy decisions can be
successful in that sense.
The main result is that the e¤ectiveness of budget consolidation plans de-
pends crucially on how much percentage change in primary budget result in
percentage changes in the average cost of debt and in nominal output. The rst
elasticity depends on a predetermined variable (the maturity structure of the
existing stock of debt) and on the impact of decit changes on the cost of new
debt issuing. The second elasticity is even more signicant, as it involves (but
does not coincide with) the scal policy multiplier. This latter elasticity is very
much dependant on the cyclical position of the economy and on the primary
budget-to-GDP ratio (in turn depending on the state of the cycle). Hence the
success of a given budget consolidation can considerably vary according to a
much wider set of variables than it seems to be understood nowadays.
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